CLIENTELISM AND LEGISLATORS’ CONSTITUENCY SERVICE PROVISION IN NIGERIA – AN OVERVIEW

Abstract

In developing societies, democratisation and governance are often marred by the influence of clientelistic dynamics, which usually define the nature of the interaction between legislators and constituents. MPs face pressure to downplay their primary law-making, representation, and oversight roles in favour of the provision of particularistic and clientelist goods or risk losing goodwill and elections. Against this background, this study presents a literature review of clientelism and constituency development services in Nigeria. As a mechanism for directing and distributing clubs and private goods, this paper isolates Constituency Development Funds in Nigeria, investigating its practices and governance implications. This study acknowledged that constituency services could be instrumental in the delivery of public goods and development initiatives at the community level. However, these services mostly take the shape of soft projects that are challenging to measure and have accountability deficits. Therefore, although constituency service activities, through the operation of Constituency Development Funds, have the prospect of engendering decentralisation of development, this is less likely in low-accountable systems. The paper reiterates the arguments that clientelism complicates and perpetuates the cycle of deprivation by jettisoning public goods for private or particularistic goods. It also undermines the quality of the delivery of legislators' primary functions.