

## INTERROGATING THE TRIGGERS OF SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPLICATION IN NIGERIA

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### Abstract

*Violence has left a mark on countries across the globe. The chief cause and/or trigger of violence differ among countries including its consequences. Containing spates of violence remains a traditional responsibility of any constituted authority especially in a democracy. The triggers of violence in Nigeria are quite unique given our ethno-religious composition and the topography. This study set out to interrogate the triggers of violence and the implication of violence through the navigation of pyramid of secondary data. The study complements existing findings which focus on arms proliferation, drug abuse and porous border as triggers of violence in Nigeria. Findings of this study expanded the frontiers of triggers of violence by suggesting that, violence has become part and parcel of Nigeria being due to the unanswered question of ethnic minority, police brutality, charms and the monster of unemployment. These trigger violence in the form of communal conflict, election violence, oil violence, intimidation and harassment of private individuals, violent protest and other forms of threats to social cohesion. Consequent upon this, there were cases of indiscriminate killing and maiming, internal displacement and wanton destruction of social and economic properties. Efforts are needed to redress the perennial issue of minority question and the attitudinal reformation of people on the use of charms in Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** communal conflict, electoral violence, minority question, Police brutality, Nigeria.

### Introduction

Violence has elicited variant intellectual thoughts both in the circle of academics and laymen. It is on course to deduce that no country on the planet earth is violent-free. In other domains, intellectuals conceive violence from its utilitarian perspective whereas on the other hand it is seen as a factor unparallel with utility. Events unfolding in recent time could show that the world is thrown into a theatre of violence in multiple dimensions. Socioeconomic and political factors are dimensions exerting unimaginable toll on violence in most countries. European countries that are seemingly less heterogeneous are defiling violence in different contexts. In some occasions, electoral violence, violence at borders and violence perpetuated by peers

leave a huge mark. Amid all these, Europe is still battling with the colossal damages in human, physical and economic resources as a result of Russian/Ukrainian war. Even before this infamous war of the century, there were cases of transnational violence between countries at border points. While Russian/Ukrainian war presents classic example of horrific assault, its perpetuation may be primarily shaped by politics of class formation. Russian's vociferous resistance to Ukraine's bid for membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is centred on security and socioeconomic factors. Also, violence at European borders is quite alarming and this tells why there has been state's resilient instrument of repression. This influenced the deployment of violence to suppress cross border crime and other related violence (Augutova, Carvapico & Obradovi-wochnik, 2021). Influx of migrants from developing countries and economically backward European countries contribute to the volatility of borders. The quest for improved working conditions, getting a good job and the fantasies of living in European countries may have attracted migrants' to navigate their way into Europe through unauthorized means. Illegal means of entry often attract settlements that are characterised with confrontations, bribe and makeshift camps which form a nucleus susceptible to high spates of violence. Aside the high probability of violence at border points, electoral violence is also noticeable in Europe. Such violence is dubbed a common characteristic of developing societies but has stamped its footprints in some European countries. Mochtak (2018) held that electoral violence posed serious challenges to societies in the phase of transformation and infant democracies in post communist Europe. This is punctuated with incidences of personal attack, intimidation and threats. When you fuse this with cases of bullying and fighting including cyber bullying among adolescence in Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia you would understand the proportion of violence in the continent (Warnai, Malinowski-cieslik, Madarasova, Csemy & Horvath, 2022).

Countries in South American have had peculiar triggers of violence. For instance, Columbia's subculture of violence is tied in some instances to her successes in drug business. This is because appreciated prices of cocaine at international markets among other factors trigger homicide rate in Municipalities (Milan-Quijano, 2020).

Africa is entangled with the fallouts of sustained violence for too long. Farmers/herders violence has been overwhelming across the region especially in the West African sub-region. Climate change and the evolving structural changes and development occasioned by urbanisation could be potent trigger of farmers/herders' loggerhead. Acute rainfall and the changing pattern of seasonal rainfall may have affected nomadic activities amid ethnic minorities question and land dispute in most African countries. The Benue valley remains an important indicator of farmers/herders violence not only in Nigeria but also West African sub-region. This is because pastoralists have migrated to the North Central region especially the Benue Valley as a result of climate induce migration exerting dire consequences on social, economic and political space (Ikoh, 2021).

Nigeria remains the most populated black nation on earth. The heterogeneity of the country is shaped by her richly mixed socio-cultural cleavages. There are over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria spread across the two dominant religions: Islam and Christianity. Such a heterogeneous enterprise could be explored to advantage but highly prone to violence and/or conflict when poorly managed. The mismanagement of a complex entity like Nigeria accounts

for the trigger of violence as demonstrated in a number of studies. Most of the findings however have pointed accusing fingers to the proliferation of arms, drug abuse and porous border (Danssaert & Word, 2021; Jatau, Sha'aban, Gulma, Shitu, Khalid, Isa, Wada, & Mustapha, 2021). The pervasiveness of drug abuse in Nigeria is disturbing despite the existing laws, policies and preventive measures. Arms have found their ways into many hands given the mismanagement and interplay of corruption in procurement and stock pile of arms and ammunitions. Available report in recent past shows that 1,103 firearms were intercepted in 2001 wherein it rose to 3,100 firearms in 2003 and 5,405 firearms and 420,281 ammunition in 2004 (Ikoh, 2021). Even though this is a factor to consider in its own right, the drug business flourishes in Nigeria. Recent data reveals about 46.6kg of hard drugs were intercepted by (NDLEA) National Drug Laws Enforcement Agency (Vanguard, 2022). This is in addition to a record 19, 341 suspect including drug barons arrested over transaction on illicit substances (Baiyewu, 2022). All these portend enormous challenges to institutions and agencies meant to maintain peace and social cohesion in Nigeria. The sustained spate of violence which could take any form of communal conflict, murder, violent protest, intimidation and harassment of innocent citizens could be the direct result of arm proliferation and impaired behavior due to drug abuse and the porosity of Nigeria's borders. This study acknowledges the imperative roles of the above factors in triggering violence but sought to peep into other mutually exclusive factors of minorities question, land dispute, corruption, poor policing, unemployment, poor socialisation and the efficacy of charms among others. Also, a lot of attention has been given to loss of lives as one of major aftermaths and/or fallouts of violence. For instance, Ayodele (2019) revealed that many lives and properties were lost in the communal violence between Erin-Ile and Offa in Kwara State. The clashes overwhelmingly affected people including children, the aged and women. This has been mindboggling given that the clashes were perpetrated by warring factions with common linguistic and cultural bonds. This shares similar fate with Ife-Modakeke's conflict in Osun State, Nigeria. These two cases of communal violence call for intellectual reflection and it is a good exemplar of the dynamics of violence in Nigeria. Lamidi (2019) revealed that the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Osun State claimed lives and displaced people as well as affected urban residential settings. This has somewhat more lateral effects than Erin-Ile and Offa communal feud. This study stakes the mutual impacts of other dire consequences emanating from the gross display of violence. However, the study among other objectives interrogates the triggers of subculture of violence and scenarios where violence marked their presence as well as the implications of violence on Nigeria's socio-economic and political spaces.

## **Theoretical Underpinning**

### **Relative deprivation**

This theory was developed by Radzinowicz and King in 1997. Relative deprivation refers to a feeling of deprivation which a group or an individual experience when its/his expectations are not met or when a group or person feels deprived in comparison to other similar groups or persons. The basic tenet of the theory is that people who are deprived of things they deem valuable either money, justice, status or opportunity and privilege in society may join social movement with the hope of redressing their grievances. This theory is also attributed to American Sociologist Robert K. Merton. His inspiration into the deprivation model was drawn from the study of American soldiers during World War II. His findings suggested that soldiers in the military police were far less satisfied with their opportunities for promotion

than the regular GIS. The theory holds that people who are deprived of valuable things in society like money, justice, power, status, wealth, privileges and opportunities are predisposed to join social movements in order to make known their demands. Social scientists have identified relative deprivation as chief cause of social movements and deviance which account for violence related acts like terrorism, violent protest, rioting and conflicts. Most communal violence and/or conflicts are rooted on perceived deprivation from unarguably in-group's manipulation. Violent protest also takes similar posture to redress deprivation. This theory does tell the cause of frustration and aggression but does not precisely reveal the direction of frustration and aggression which in the long run degenerate into violence claiming lives and property. In order to account for this shortcoming, the theory of frustration and aggression is being reviewed.

### **Frustration-aggression theory**

Frustration-aggression theory was conceived in 1939 by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, O.H Mowrer, and Robert Sears. The theory holds that aggression is the aftermaths of blocking, or frustrating, a person's efforts to attain a goal. In the latter formulation, the theory stated that while frustration prompts a behavior that may or may not be aggressive, any aggressive behavior is the result of frustration, making frustration not sufficient, but a necessary condition for aggression. This theory is also used to explain violence, riots and revolutions, which both are believed to be caused by poorer and more deprived sections of society who may express their accumulated frustration and anger through violence.

This theory provides clear explanation to the rationale behind communal conflict and violence. As argued by the theorists, the aggressive tendency of a frustrated or deprived group is borne out of the sheer frustration they encountered in the course of achieving their goals. Ethno-religiously inclined feuds, land/boundary issue emanating from dispute over ownership, chieftdom tussle, summed to frustrate the natives from achieving their goals on their soil. Their goal responses are blocked by rivals. The result of this frustration manifests in the form of communal violence, protest, intimidation and harassment of innocent citizens. The latent implication of all these are that, it impinges negatively on development and disproportionately claimed lives and properties.

### **Triggers of Subculture of Violence in Nigeria**

There is no gain saying that the minorities question is a significant challenge facing Nigeria today. With a vast ethnic composition, Nigeria is always looking for the right recipe to nip in the bud factors nursing ethnic cum religious tensions. The unanswered question of alleged marginalization and injustice suffered by minority group remains a bone of contention in the reoccurring spates of violence in most parts of Nigeria. The trust of the minority question and/or resentment emanates from the three major tribes: Hausa, Ibos and Yoruba's manipulation of the geography of Nigeria into three regions (Obi, 2017). These ethnic groups represent face identification of the North, East and West respectively. Other ethnic nationalities in the North are eclipsed by the Hausas/Fulani hegemony in social, economic and political fronts. This same fate is suffered by other ethnic nationalities that are subdued by the Ibos and Yoruba in the South. In almost every election cycle, the Hausa/Fulani would champion the Northern slot for Presidency and other juicy political positions while the Yoruba and Ibos would make similar claim in the South. Only in 2011 that Goodluck Ebele Jonathan from a minority tribe in the South held sway the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Groups in North Central Nigeria have echoed the need for a President from the region particularly from the minority tribe. Such call has inbuilt tendency to throw Nigeria into a state of chaos. Agbese (2003) suggested the struggle for equal right by ethnic minorities as a factor in the perpetuation of political violence in Nigeria. On another front, tussle and yearning for equal right could sow discord thereby nursing violence on grounds of majority and minority divides. Here, grievances are expressed within a large fold of minority groups under the guise of alleged discrimination. North Central Nigeria owes the ace to the series of violence being due to minority question. The struggle to wrestle political power creates avenue for mayhem. For instance, the infamous Baba Alakyo's escapade represents classic institutionalization of violence in Nasarawa State. Eggon's pursuit of the most coveted seat in Nasarwa State birthed the Ombatse Movement in which the late Baba Alakyo served as the spiritual leader. The movement sought to address alleged political injustices wherein violence raised its ugly head claiming lots of lives and properties including security operatives. However, the question of power sharing arrangement and the uneven distribution of resources have been at the centre of ethnic tension and violence which birthed the formation of ethnic militias in Nigeria (Public Broadcasting Service News, 2007).

Land is one of potent factors exacerbating the minority question in Nigeria and most parts of African countries. It appears as a factor of resource control causing violence and conflict in North Central region (Ikoh, 2021). There has been violent ethnic protest occasioned by the twin contradictions over land and citizenship tailored along majority and minority dichotomy (Arowosegbe, 2016). A vast population of the natives in rural African societies survives through primary occupation. Land offers the needed resources for the execution of primary activities like farming, fishing and animal production, mining and quarrying among others. This creates social division and class formation including fierce competitions and violent dispute over land (Peters, 2004). The nature of conflict over land could be between private individual against another and violence between ethnic groups against a perceived minority ethnic group. Among many causes of land violence, a typical majority group in Nigeria often labels a perceived minority group as settlers hence meant to occupy second fiddle in terms of ownership and access to not only land but other economic resources. In the march to upholding this egocentric assumption, provocations could ensue to pitch one group against another. The perennial spates of violence in the Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta is attributed to the contentious access to and ownership of oil resources in the land. Violent approaches which shape the pattern of the struggle to get what belongs to the people is often justified on grounds of government's neglect of the natives amid the repercussions of environmental degradation. On land matters, most recently, Channels Television (2022) revealed violence between farmers and herders orchestrated by struggle over land, grazing and water right in North Central Nigeria.

Another factor at the center of violence is the Nigerian Police bid to entrench Social Cohesion. This is characterised with lots of shortcomings which contribute to igniting the already violent prone space in Nigeria. The police are the first law enforcement agency at the battle front to contain civil violence and other related offences. Citizens in volatile areas look up to the police for rescue. Instead of arresting likely occurrence of crime and violence, police in contemporary Nigeria may have contributed to triggering violence through its culture of brutality. This represents one among the numerous shortcomings of the Nigerian police today. Findings

have traced the genesis of police brutality to the colonial epoch. The primary duty of the Nigerian police during the colonial era was to promote economic and political interest of the colonizers and this was consolidated by brutal subjugation of communities and repression of resistance to colonial rule (Iornienge & Ade, 2021). Brutal forces were deployed on erring individuals whose demeanour went against the interest of the colonial masters. This mentality became the defining characteristics of the Nigeria police. Most civilians find no trust and seem not to accept the notion of police is your friend. While the police towed the colonial structure in which the protection of lives and properties of the locals was secondary, the natives had nursed ingrained suspicion and distrust of the police. This subculture of brutality and distrust is not only noticeable now but also suggest substantial characteristics of the Nigerian police. The aftermaths of these irregularities are that they are greeted with fierce civilian attack and unwanted label on the police in some quarters. Akinlabi (2020) held that police deployment of excessive force has impinged negatively on public trust of the Nigerian police. Rather than seeing the police as friends to report civil misunderstanding and crime, civilians would prefer to take laws into their hands and this could trigger violence. It is not out of place to suggest that the eroding civilian confidence and trust and victims lived experiences of police brutality and injustices affect in no small measure the professional act of policing including the subculture of violence in Nigeria. Adding to the woes of violence is the deliberate absence of the police to control the scene of violence. This is because police can easily be bribed to stay away from crime scene (Ikoh, 2021).

Endsars protest remains the mother of all protests that was leveraged by police excesses in Nigeria since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Recounting the dire consequences of the protest could be quiet devastating on both factions: the protesters and the government. Nevertheless, police extortion and extra judicial killings among others informed the call for the disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) (Adisa, Alabi & Adejoh, 2020). Instead of being the architect of containing violence, the Nigerian police is labeled a corrupt and violent inclined institution by Nigerians (Agbibo, 2015). Osasona (2020) corroborated that the reputation of the Nigerian police since time immemorial have been punctuated with corruption, ineptitude and impunity. The indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians by the then SARS does not only deteriorate human security but also created the leeway for perpetual acrimony among the citizens thereby worsening the state of insecurity. The latent consequences of the protest are grievous given that some miscreants hijacked the processes to vent violence, raid and destroy properties. This is evident in the recent 'Endsars' memorial which led to the firing of teargas by the Nigerian police to suppress the situation.

Unemployment is another monster leveraging violence in Nigeria. Haltinner (2016) observed that militia activities reached its crescendo in the 1990s due to the massive economic restructuring which culminated into loss of manufacturing jobs including the destruction of the family farm. The Nigerian situation is not exempted given the incessant case of communal conflict and election violence. There is cheap army of idle youths for recruitment into violent related activities. This justifies Salami's findings (2013) which conceived unemployment in Nigeria as a time bomb ready for explosion if robust attempts are not put in place to arrest the situation. Ikwuba (2010) held that with the rising rate of unemployment, a number of youths in Nigeria are redefining themselves by creating their own social world like street and gangsters syndrome.

The contours of violence in Nigeria are shaped by the potent powers of charms. Nigerians have much confidence in the efficacy of charms during conflict and other related violence. This is obtainable given the positive connection between witchcraft, sorcery and inherent violence (Moro, 2017). Youths fortified with spiritual powers subscribe to violence at the slightest provocations. Deployment of charms during communal conflict, violent protest and altercation sabotage effort of security agency at the frontline of maintaining order. Police offensive during violence is characterized with bizarre incidence of spiritually fortified youths who confront the police even in the face of sporadic shooting. Rather than retreating to avoid stray bullets, youths retire to their homes or hideout to pick amulet as shield to anticipated full blown violence either against the state or private individuals.

Family socialization plays defining role in the development of individuals with the right moral aptitude for de-radicalization. Ikoh (2021) suggested that the evolution of media technology birth the proliferation of satellite transmission, the remote control, video recorder and the internet in which youths are exposed to unhealthy behavior like physical aggression, smoking and drinking which constitute in-group values. Eroding family socialization denies young generation the requisite values for peaceful co-existence. Within the context of poor family socialization, children are exposed to violent videos and movies thus creating window of opportunity to learn alien violent values and norms. Sometimes, children demonstrate these strange values at play ground with their peers, and this could be transited into adulthood. The provision of toy guns to children is one of the impinging challenges of parenting today. While parents and guardian may see this as a bid to show compassion and love to their children, its consequences could be damning. The adage: pick the pen, not the gun is deafening.

### **Exploring Scenarios and the Consequences of Violence in Nigeria**

Violence in different forms has been noticeable in Nigeria. It could be examined in different scenarios in Nigeria. Among many of these scenarios is periodic electoral or political violence. Elections in Nigeria are done periodically. Political and/or election violence presents themselves during elections. The heterogeneity of Nigeria, the multiplicities of political parties and the factor of winning elections at all cost are elemental to nursing and creating the enabling environment for electoral violence. Internal fracas and feuds manifest not only between rival political parties but also within a party's fold. Obakhedo (2011) found perpetual incidences of inter-party and intra-party violence in Nigeria's body polity. Primary elections conducted within the ranks of a party could sow discord among and/or between members of a party. Grievances and anti-party demaneuor from aggrieved contestants who lost out at primaries are potent predisposing factors of post electoral violence. Olakunle, Bamidele, Modupe, Oluwaseun and Magdalene (2019), suggested that power drunk politicians stir the atmosphere of electoral violence through the deployment of unemployed and non-literate youths against perceived political rivals. Youths have been at the front burner of instances involving snatching of ballot boxes, intimidation and harassment of rival opponents, disruption of voting processes and distortion of election results thereby leaving a huge mark on Nigeria's electioneering processes. Often times these possess the inbuilt tendencies to degenerate into a full blown violence in an attempt to suppress such mal-practices and intimidation and harassment by rival youth wing. In some instances, the thirst for manipulating election results could inform the deployment of violence by incumbent

government (Onapajo, 2014). The incidences of pre-election and post election violence are sensitive in any discourse on elections instability in Nigeria. A detailed perusal of Nigeria's diary of election violence in the 2011 General elections and the succeeding years shows scenarios of killings and bizarre practices. One of the aftermaths of the 2011 General elections was the killing of corps members who were serving their father land. Beyond electoral violence there are cases of violent protest in Nigeria.

Endsars protest offers the best scenario of collective violence that devastated socio-economic institutions and socio-economic activities in Nigeria. Lagos the birth place of the protest was the hardest hit given that the protest did not only destroy socio-economic institutions but also led to the raiding of palace of Oba of Lagos thereby desecrating the culture and tradition of the Yoruba. The chief cause of the protest has been pointed to the collective resentment of police accountability (Ojedokun & Aderinto, 2021). This is said to have latent implication on policing and law enforcement in Nigeria.

Oil violence is fully represented in the diary of violence in Nigeria. Since the discovery of oil, the Nigeria's Delta region turned into a battlefield. The natives of oil communities and the government as well as private oil firms have had tussles in a bid to define the nomenclature of oil ownership in the context of who gets what, how and why. Way-back, the rising cases of violent anti-oil protests in Nigeria's rich oil communities leveraged the development of new ways of securing the environment including oil dividends (Omeje, 2006). As earlier indicated, injustice and crass handling of minorities' plight in the oil region have been at the center of violence. Ukeje (2004) suggested that ill-treated oil communities resorted to violent protest against the formidable conspiracy of the Nigerian Government and multinational corporations.

However, the implications of heightened violence in Nigeria are alarming. In-depth analysis of events in social and economic space reveals scenarios of violence with dire repercussions like killings, displacement of people, destruction of properties and killing of security operatives in Nigeria. The Endsars protest claimed lives and destroyed properties in large quantities. Findings reveal however, the Erin-Ile and Offa communal crisis in Kwara State left magnitude of devastation on lives and properties. Ayodele (2019) revealed that many lives and properties were lost in the communal clashes between Erin-Ile and Offa in Kwara State. The clashes overwhelmingly affected people including children, the aged and women. This has been mindboggling given that the clashes were perpetrated by warring factions with common linguistic and cultural bonds. This shares similar fate with Ife-Modakeke's conflict in Osun State, Nigeria. These two cases of communal conflict call for intellectual reflection and it is a good exemplar of the dynamics of conflict in Nigeria. Lamidi (2019) revealed that the Ife-Modakeke conflict in Osun State claimed lives and displaced people as well as affected urban residential settings. This has somewhat more lateral effects than Erin-Ile and Offa communal feud. This is because having resulted in colossal loss of lives; the Ife-Modakeke crises orchestrated the displacement of people thereby leaving a mark on the record of IDPs in Osun State. The old urban residential settings have been disrupted thereby dividing the community's residential settings along ethnic lines. Fear of the unknown might have made residents to relocate to residential settings that house a significant population of their ally in order to avoid attack. Cases of killing of illustrious sons and daughters, business moguls,



intellectuals, the clergies and Royal fathers cast new light on the phenomenon of loss of lives during communal violence.

Issifu (2021) affirmed that communal conflict in Dagbon, Northern Ghana claimed the life of the king of Dagbon and forty other precious lives. Killing royal fathers depicts the peak of cruelty and lethality of violence. This could possess inbuilt characteristics of leveraging the reoccurrence of conflict to avenge for a loss of a revered personality. This is replicated in Nigeria as Report by Nigeria's geopolitical intelligence platform has it that 53 traditional rulers have been killed in violent attacks in Nigeria in the past 10 years (Adebulu, 2021). Very recently, the activities of IPOB and ESN have taken the centre stage in Nigeria's security discourses. The atmosphere has been tensed following the gruesome killing of traditional rulers. Opejobi (2021) reported that the Indigenous People of Biafra IPOB and Eastern Security Network ESN killed two traditional rulers in Imo State. This may have raised the tempo of panic and persistent fears. Such ugly development may have prostrated social and economic activities in the region.

However, findings have suggested attack on social and economic property. Escaleras and Register (2011) revealed that ethnic tension frustrates the formation of social infrastructure and stampede development. This is corroborated by Donaubaauer, Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2019) who revealed that social and economic infrastructure suffer negatively during conflict. To them, social infrastructure is more effective to refurbish in a post conflict aid than economic infrastructure. This is because refurbishing damaged social infrastructure is seemingly easier than that of economic infrastructure especially the delicate ones like bridges, telecommunication mask and electrical installations. Economic infrastructure like markets, shops and farms offers means of livelihood to people. The destruction of means of livelihood does portend misery and untold hardship. Akpehe, Dewua, Mase and Timin (2021) found that communal violence in North Central Nigeria has led to wanton destruction of property and sources of livelihood of rural farmers. The destruction of economically viable properties like farms, shops, markets and storages subjects inhabitants to destitution and poverty. This could irk jobless and destitute rural folks into anti social behavior like kidnapping, armed robbery and extortion.

## **Conclusion**

Violence is an undesirable phenomenon that is triggered by the unanswered minorities' question, indigene versus non-indigene dichotomy, land, charms, family socialization, and police brutality among others. These complement the flocked factors of arm proliferation, drug abuse and porous border which remarkably ignite violence in Nigeria. The triggers of violence have influenced the manifestation of violence in the form of communal conflict and/or violence, violent protest, intimidation and harassment of private individuals. All these have led to loss of lives, income and properties in wanton proportion. The Nigerian state will continue to drag itself into the pool of violence given the sustained conundrum of minorities question among others. Containing the menace of violence requires finding suitable panacea for entrenching equal rights across minority and majority's ethnic group as well as curbing police brutality, land dispute and the menace of unemployment.

## Recommendations

- i. There is every need to address the unanswered question of minorities' discrimination in Nigeria.
- ii. Proactive measures should be taken to address land related matters.
- iii. Efforts should be made to create employment opportunities in Nigeria.
- iv. Appropriate mechanism should be put in place to checkmate police excesses and brutality.
- v. Religious institutions should intensify efforts in dissociating and discouraging people from the use of charms.
- vi. Parents/guardian should censor their wards/children's access to violent internet videos and materials.

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