

## THE INDISPENSABILITY OF STATE ACTORS IN WORLD AFFAIRS: AN INTERROGATION

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### Abstract

*The focus of this paper is an attempt to advance reasons for the inevitability of the state actors in a world that the purported erosion of states power is trending. It is on this problematic premise that this paper critiqued the arguments for and against the power of the state in international relations and advanced to interrogate whether or not the liberal theorists have superior arguments over their realists counterpart. In order to achieve this objective, the paper used qualitative data from the secondary sources and argues that previous studies counteracted state actors on the grounds that they are belligerent in their relations in the international systems, whereas individuals and transnational groups to them are more cooperative in their relations with each other, without considering the role the state have played in the past and are still playing in the present. It is within this gap in international politics literatures that this paper interrogated the importance and relevance of states actors in international system. The study thus revealed that what made interactions in the international system worthwhile is the pivotal role played by the state in which other actors revolves. The paper concludes that the state actors remain the undisputable giants in the international system, while others, (non-state actors) are to supplement the state, which the liberalists concurred.*

**Keywords: International politics, State actors, Non-state actors, Globalization.**

### Introduction

The apotheosization of the transnational groups and the deification of individuals and TNCs as the dominant actors have been articulated in grandiloquent terms and with considerable gusto by liberal theorists of international relations. Unlike the states that is epitomized as generally wallowing in conflict and are belligerent in their relations with one another, the individuals and transnational groups has been popularized by the liberals as actors in which their actions and activities are sacrosanct in essence and virtually infallible in their operational

vivacity. It is often stated that in the aftermath of the Post Cold war international politics, that Western capitalism has triumphed over the Eastern communist ideology which Fukuyama (1992) termed the end of history, because of the preponderance and entrenchment of Western democratic principles, values and ethos in most countries of the globe. Of course, increasing globalization has gone hand in hand with greater democracy.

Globalism from the perspective of individual countries or national economies, global adjustment, is the current hegemonic development paradigm, with the growth of a free-functioning world market as its ideological core. Therefore, since this process is considered synonymous with increased economic efficiency and a higher world product, globalists consider "too much government" to be a systemic fault. Until recently, good governance was often equated to less government. Globalism as an ideology thus argued in favor of a particular form of globalization, i.e. economic integration on a world scale. As observed by (UNRISD, 1995; 2000), there is little consensus as to the social consequences of globalization but, undoubtedly, the process is putting a large number of nation-states under pressure, which they find increasingly difficult to withstand. With monotonous regularity, one keeps hearing the view that the transnational groups are indispensable force for promoting cooperation in the globe.

The retreat of states from its historical functions according to analysts which implies that a changed relationship between the state and what is called the civil society is trending (Tester, 1992; Chadhoke, 1995), as such a tendency for the state to become alienated from it, is glaring. What we are set to do in this paper is to examine the Liberal theory of international relation, which has given theoretical basis to the concept of globalization and the argument for the erosion of the state in the international system that is globalizing. The question remains, has the globalization process progressed without the deliberate input from states? Has the state ceased to be the initiator and facilitator of events in the global system? In this paper therefore, the onus is on ours to interrogate the indispensability of state actors in world affairs. As surmised by Kaufmann, et al., (1999), Collier (2000) and Government of Britain (2000), the social activity aimed at achieving peace and prosperity must be directed by a competent and neutral state. The question remains how neutral are states? When the state is crucial for the efficient functioning of markets since it is vested with the power to protect property, supply public goods, and is, at least in theory, the social entity entrusted with an encompassing interest in society and providing the enabling environment for business to thrive (Olson, 2000; Bates, 2001).

### **Liberal theory revisited**

The liberal approach to theorizing international relations, like realism, and other approaches, is a name given to a family of related theories of international relations. Here it will not be used, as many use it in international relations, to designate theories that stress the importance of international institutions. Nor to designate theories that stresses the importance of universal, altruistic or utopian values of a liberal sort, such as human rights or democracy. Nor to designate theories favoured by left-wing (liberal) political parties or policies in the US. Instead, it is a theory that stresses the role of the varied *social interests and values* of states, and their relevance for global politics.

Liberals argue that the universal condition of world politics is *globalization*. States are, and always have been, embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for economic, social and cultural interaction across borders. State policy may facilitate or block such interactions. Some domestic groups may benefit from or be enamored by such policies, and they pressure government accordingly for policies that facilitate the realization of their goals. These social pressures, transmitted through domestic political institutions, define "state preferences" – as the set of substantive social purposes that motivate foreign policy. State preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues they face. Since the domestic and transnational social context in which states are embedded varies greatly across space and time, so do state preferences. Without such social concerns that transcend state borders, states would have no rational incentive to engage in global politics at all, but would simply devote their resources to an autarkic and isolated existence. To motivate conflict, cooperation, or any other costly foreign policy action, states must possess sufficiently intense state preferences. The ensuing globalization-induced variation in social demands, and thus state preferences, is a fundamental cause of state behavior in global politics. This is the central insight of liberal international relations theory. It can be expressed sarcastically in various ways: *"What matters most is what states want, not how they get it."* Or simply put, *"Ends are more important than means."*

Liberal theory is unique in the nature of the variables it privileges. The liberal position on variation in socially-determined state preferences distinguishes liberal theory from other theoretical traditions: realism (focusing on variation in coercive power resources), institutionalism (focusing on information), and most non-rational approaches (focusing on patterns of beliefs about appropriate means-ends relationships). In explaining patterns of belligerence, for example, liberals do not look to inter-state imbalances of power, bargaining failure due to private information or uncertainty, or particular non-rational beliefs or propensities of individual leaders, societies, or organizations. Liberals look instead to conflicting state preferences derived from hostile nationalist or political ideologies, disputes over appropriable economic resources, or exploitation of unrepresented political constituencies. For liberals, a necessary condition for war is that social pressures lead one or more "aggressor" states to possess "revisionist" preferences so extreme or risk-acceptant that other states are unwilling to submit.

There are two distinctive assumptions underlying and distinguishing liberal theories. We shall further explicate the variants of liberal theory that follow from these assumptions with a view to review some distinctive strength that liberal theories tend to share vis-à-vis other types of international relations theory. Again the question is what basic assumptions underlie the liberal approach? Three assumptions liberal theory make are the assumptions of *anarchy* and *rationality*. Specifically, *states (or other political actors) exist in an anarchic international environment and they generally act in a broadly rational way in making decisions*. The anarchy assumption means that political actors exist in the distinctive environment of international politics, without a world government or any other authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. They must engage in self-help. The rationality assumption means that state leaders and their domestic supporters engage in foreign policy for the instrumental purpose of securing benefits provided by (or avoiding costs imposed by) actors outside of their borders, and in making such calculations, states seek to deploy the most cost-effective

means to achieve whatever their ends (preferences) may be. Liberal theory shares the first (anarchy) assumption with almost all international relations theories, and it shares the second (rationality) assumption with realism and institutionalism, but not non-rationalist process theories.

Liberal theories are distinguished from other rationalist theories, such as realism and institutionalism, by two unique assumptions about world politics: (1) States represent social groups, whose views constitute state preferences; and (2) Interdependence among state preferences influences state policy. Let us consider each in turn.

The first assumption shared by liberal theories is that state is not only the actor in the international system but represented by some subset of domestic society, whose views constitute state preferences. For liberals, the state is a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by domestic social coalitions. These social coalitions define state “preferences” in world politics at any point in time: the “tastes,” “ends,” “basic interests,” or “fundamental social purposes” that underlie foreign policy. Political institutions constitute a critical “transmission belt” by which these interests of individuals and groups in civil society enter the political realm. All individuals and groups do not wield equal influence over state policy. To the contrary, their power varies widely, depending on the context. Variation in the precise nature of representative institutions and practices helps define which groups influence the “national interest.” The precise preferences of social groups, weighted by their domestic power, shape the underlying goals (“state preferences”) that states pursue in world politics. Sometimes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors may form transnational alliances to assist social forces. “State-society relations”—the relationship between a state and its domestic (and transnational) society in which it is embedded—lies at the center of liberal theory.

The liberals generally take a positive view of human nature they have great faith in human reason and they are convinced that rational principles can be applied to international affairs. They recognize that individuals are self-interested and competitive up to a point. But they also believe that individuals share many interests and can thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as internationally, which results in greater benefits for everybody at home and abroad. Put differently, conflict and war are not inevitable; when people engage their reason they can achieve mutual beneficial cooperation not only within states but also across international boundaries. Liberal theorists thus stress that human reason can triumph over human fear and the lust for power. But they differ about the magnitude of the obstacles on the way to human progress (Smith, 1992). To the liberals, they agreed the circumstances, notwithstanding insofar that modernization constantly increases the scope and the need for cooperation, success is attainable (Zacher & Matthew 1995:119).

Liberals believe that state preferences cannot be reduced to some simple metric or preference ordering, such as seeking “security” or “wealth”. Most modern states are not Spartan: They compromise security or sovereignty in order to achieve other ends, or, indeed, just to save money. Nor do modern states uniformly seek “wealth.” Instead they strike rather strike complex and varied trade-offs among economic, social and political goals. Nor, finally do they

seek “power” in the sense of “domination”: Many countries would clearly rather spend money on “butter” rather than “guns.” To see how consequential the variation in goals can be, one need look no further than the implications for international relations of Germany's evolution from Adolf Hitler's preference for militant nationalism, fascist rule, autarky, and ruthless exploitation of German *Lebensraum* under *Das Dritte Reich* to the social compromise underlying the postwar *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, which favored capitalist democracy, expanding German exports, and peaceful reunification. Similarly one can look at the striking change in policy between Maoist and post-Maoist China, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, Imperial and post-Imperial Japan, and so on.

The second core assumption shared by liberal theories is that *the interdependence among of state preferences influences state behavior*. Rather than treating preferences as a fixed constant, as do realists or institutionalists, liberals seek to explain variation in preferences and its significance for world politics. The precise distribution and nature of the “stakes” explains differences in state policy and behavior. States, liberals argue, orient their behavior to the precise nature of these underlying preferences: compatible or conflictual, intense or weak, and their precise scope. States require a “social purpose” — a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand — in order to pay any attention to international affairs, let alone to provoke conflict, inaugurate cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action. If there is no such interdependence among state objectives, a rational state will conduct no international relations, satisfying itself with an isolated and autarkic existence. Conflictual goals increase the incentive for of political disputes. Convergence of underlying preferences creates the preconditions for peaceful coexistence or cooperation.

The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and state behavior, on the other, is the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence refers to the distribution and interaction of preferences—that is, the extent to which the pursuit of state preferences necessarily imposes costs and benefits (known as *policy externalities*) upon other states, independent of the “transaction costs” imposed by the specific strategic means chosen to obtain them. Depending on the underlying pattern of interdependence, each of the qualitative categories above, the form, substance, and depth of conflict and cooperation vary according to the precise nature and intensity of preferences. Interdependence means mutual dependence: peoples and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere, by the actions of their counterparts in other countries. Thus, a higher level of transnational relations between countries means a higher level of interdependence. That also reflects the process of modernization, which usually increases the level of interdependence between states. The 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially the period since, 1950 has seen the rise of a large number of highly industrialized countries. Rosecrance (1999, 1995, 1986) has analyzed the effects of these developments on the policies of states. Throughout history states have sought power by means of military force and territorial expansion. But for highly industrialized countries economic development and foreign trade are more adequate and less costly means of achieving prominence and prosperity. But there is an exception to this thesis to the use of force to achieve prosperity. For in recent past the United States applied force in Iraq to have access to the countries oil, with the pretense of war against terrorism. The liberal theorist stress that the most economic successful countries of the world are the “trading states” such as Japan and Germany. While the U.S and Russia who pursued the traditional military- political option

have soft- paddle by maintaining a hybrid option- a mixture of high politics and low politics options hold sway.

That being said, the existence of some measure of divergent fundamental beliefs, scarcity of material goods, and inequalities in domestic political power among states and social actors renders inevitable some measure of pluralism and competition among and within states. Unlike realists such as Waltz and Morgenthau, liberals do not assume these divergent interests are uniformly zero-sum. At the same time, liberals reject the utopian notion (often attributed to them by realists) of an automatic harmony of interest among individuals and groups in international society. Nor do liberals argue, as realists like Morgenthau charge, believe that each state pursues an ideal goal, oblivious of what other states do. Liberals argue instead that each state seeks to realize distinct preferences or interests under constraints imposed by the different interests of other states, (Waltz, 1979). This distribution of preferences varies considerably. For liberals, this variation—not realism’s distribution of capabilities or institutionalism’s distribution of information—is of decisive causal importance in explaining state behavior.

A few examples illustrate how liberal theories differ from realist, institutionalist or non-rational ones. We have already encountered the example of war in the introduction, in which liberals stress states with aggressive preferences, rather than imbalances of power, incomplete information, or non-rational beliefs and processes. Another illustration is trade policy. Economists widely agree that free trade is superior welfare-improving policy choice for states, yet trade protection is often practiced. To explain protectionism, liberals look to domestic social preferences. An important factor in almost all countries is the competitive position of affected economic sectors in global markets, which generates domestic and transnational distributional effects: Protectionism is generally backed by producers who are globally uncompetitive; free trade by producers who are globally competitive. Moreover, even if the state is a net beneficiary from free trade, domestic adjustment costs may be too high to tolerate politically, or may endanger other countervailing domestic social objectives, such as domestic social equality or environmental quality. Certain domestic political institutions, such as non-parliamentary legislative systems, which governed US trade policy before 1934, grant disproportionate power to protectionist interests.

This differs from realist explanations of trade protectionism, which tend to stress the role of “hegemonic power” in structuring trade liberalization, or the need to defend self-sufficient national security within the prevailing zero-sum geopolitical competition, perhaps by maintaining self-sufficiency or by aiding allies at the expense of purely economic objectives. Institutionalists might cite the absence of appropriate international institutions, or other means to manage the complex informational tasks and collective action problems—negotiation, dispute resolution, enforcement—required to manage free trade. Those who focus on non-rational theories (psychological, cultural, organizational, epistemic, perceptual or bureaucratic) might stress an ideological disposition to accept “mercantilist” theory, shared historical analogies, and the psychological predisposition to avoid losses.

To further illustrate the importance of patterns of policy interdependence, consider the following three circumstances: zero-sum, harmonious and mixed preferences. In the case of

*zero-sum* preferences, attempts by dominant social groups in one state to realize their preferences through international action may necessarily impose costs on dominant social groups in other countries. This is a case of “zero-sum” preferences, similar to the “realist” world. Governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict. Many ancient cities and states, including those of Ancient Athens, often imposed imperial tribute on defeated neighbors or, in extremis, killed the male population, cast women and children into slavery, and repopulated the town with their own citizens—a situation approximating zero-sum conflict. Today, it might still be argued that there are certain cases—trade in agricultural goods by industrial democracies, for example—where entrenched national interests are so strong that no government seriously considers embracing free trade. In the case of *harmonious* preferences, where the externalities of unilateral policies are optimal (or insignificant) for others, there are strong incentives for quiet coexistence with low conflict and (at most) simple forms of interstate coordination. For example, advanced industrial democracies today no longer contemplate waging war on one another, and in some areas governments have agreed to mutual recognition of certain legal standards without controversy. One case of *mixed* preferences is bargaining, where states can achieve common gains (or avoid common losses, as with a war) if they agree to coordinate their behavior, but may disagree strongly on the distribution of benefits or adjustment costs. Under such circumstances, one of the most important determinants of bargaining power is the intensity of the preferences of each party; the more intense their preference for a beneficial settlement, the more likely they are to make concessions (or employ coercive means) in order to achieve it. Another situation of mixed motives is a situation where interstate coordination can avoid significant risks and costs, as in agreement to avoid naval incidents at sea, or to share information on infectious diseases. In such situations, institutional pre-commitments and the provision of greater information can often improve the welfare of all parties.

Liberals derive several distinctive conceptions of power, very different from that of realism. One form of international influence, for liberals, stems from the interdependence among preferences that Keohane and Nye *Power and Interdependence* call “asymmetrical interdependence” (1977; 2001). All other things being equal, the more interdependent a state is, the more intense its preference for a given outcome, the more power others potentially have over it; while the less a state wants something, the less a state cares about outcomes, the less intense its preferences, the less power others have over it. Situations of asymmetrical interdependence, where one state has more intense preference for an agreement than another, create bargaining power. In trade negotiations, for example, smaller and poorer countries are often more dependent on trade and thus benefit more from free trade, and thus tend to have a weaker position and make more concessions in the course of negotiations. Here again the liberalists got it wrong again, that the poor countries felt that they will be better off in a world of interdependence. The question remains are they developed as they are made to belief or is the development still widening? In this wise, power is critical to determining what you have in any relation that you enter in the international system. The powerful states are out-muscling the weak states in international economic relations. Enlargement of the European Union is a recent instance. Relative preference intensity can also influence the outcome of war, but in a different way. International relations were directed by state leaders dealing with other state leaders. The use of military force was always an option in the case of conflict between leaders. The ‘high politics’ of security and survival had priority over the ‘low politics’ of

economics and social affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1977:23). Relations between states nowadays are not only or even primarily relations between state leaders; there are relations on many different levels via many different actors and branches of government.

To the liberalist of the interdependence genre, they are of the view that international relations are becoming more like domestic politics, where different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. However, in most of these conflicts military force they averred is irrelevant. Therefore, power resources other than military ones are of increasing importance, for example, negotiating skills. Finally, under complex interdependence states become more preoccupied with the 'low politics' of welfare and less concerned with the 'high politics' of national security (Nye 1993:169; Keohane & Nye 1977:24-26). The liberal interdependence theorists implies that a far more friendly and cooperative relationship between states. According to Keohane and Nye (1977) several consequences follow. First, states will pursue different goals simultaneously and transnational corporations will pursue their own separate goals free from state control. Second, power resources will be more often be specific to issue areas. Third, the importance of international organizations will increase. They are said to arenas for political actions by weak states, they animate coalition formation, and they oversee the setting of international agendas, but never are they fears tackled headlong.

Keohane and Nye (1977) were apt to stress that realism is still relevant in explaining events in the international system. They discountenance the view that realism is obsolete. To them:

*It is not impossible to imagine dramatic conflict or revolutionary change in which the use of threat of military force over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist assumptions would again be a reliable guide to events (Keohane & Nye 1977:28).*

What could be gleaned from the above is that the use of force can still be applied in a world that is said to be globalizing. The scramble for African oil by the US with the fear that China is out witting the former led to the US establishing their military presence through the US-African Command. Also the interdependence liberals are thus more balanced in their approach than some other liberals for whom everything has changed for the better and the old world of violent conflict, unbridled state power, and the dictatorship of the national interest is gone forever. It has been observed among the liberalists that, in adopted this middle-of-the-road position interdependence liberals face the challenge of deciding exactly how much has changed, how much remains the same, and what the precise implications are for international relations.

### **Sociological Liberalism variant**

The realist remains resolute that international relations, is the study of relations between the governments of sovereign states. However, the sociological liberals were adverse to this view as being narrowly focused. Rather, international relations transcend the state-state relations to include transnational relations, i.e. relations between people, groups, and organizations belonging to different countries. Here the emphasis is on society as well as the state, on many different types of actor and just national governments. Transitional relations are considered by sociological liberals to be an increasingly important aspect of international relations.



Rosenau (1980), conceptualized transnationalism as the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies that can and do have important consequences. The word “supplemented” used by the sociological liberals presupposes that the state are at the fore front of interactions at the international sphere, while the individuals and transnational groups are secondary in international relations. In focusing on transnational relations, sociological liberals had to revert to an old theme in liberal thinking: the notion that relations between people are more cooperative and more supportive of peace than are relations between national governments. However this assertion is not tenable, in the sense that when you look at the successes recorded within the EU, it was not the relations among individuals, but was initiated by six founding member-states that include: France, Italy Germany, Belgium, Netherland and Luxemburg; the EU today is the most successful economic bloc in the globe. It is the collectives of states that made it possible. Also, the relative international peace in the international system was made possible by the initiative of the US mobilizing other countries.

Again, many sociological liberals hold the view that transnational relations between people from different countries help create new forms of human society which alongside or even in competition with nation-state. Rosenau (1990; 1992), further developed the sociological liberal approach to transnational relations. He focuses on transnational relations at the macro-level of human populations in addition to those conducted at the micro-level by individuals. He argues that individual transactions have important implications and consequences for global affairs. Here, the sociological liberals made a rash conclusion by stating the following that has been questionable given the position of the state in international relations:

1. International relation is not only state-centric; but also a study of relations between private individuals, groups, and societies as such has brought peace. Hence, the erosion and dispersion of state and governmental power.
2. The keying in to the global agenda of new, interdependence issues (such as environmental pollution, currency crises, the drug trade AIDS, and terrorism) has made more salient the processes whereby global dynamics affect the welfare and pocketbooks of individuals.
3. The revolution in information technologies has made it possible for citizens and politicians literally to visualize the aggregation of micro actions into macro outcomes. People can now observe support and gather momentum through events transmitted on cable networks across the globe.
4. This new-found capacity of citizens to ‘see’ their role in the dynamics of aggregation has profoundly altered and possibly even reduced, the extent to which organization and leadership are factors in the mobilization of publics. Leaders are increasingly becoming followers because individuals are becoming aware that their actions can have consequences (Rosenau, 1992:274-6).

Despite, this perturbation of the sociological liberals and the purported erosion of the state as a result of globalization, one important inference made out here is that all the variants of liberalist theory points to the importance of the state in international relations only for the latter to conclude that in this era of globalization the states are irrelevant. The response of the Neorealist is germane in this discourse. To them, they are critical of the role the liberals attach to international institutions, which the institutional liberals adduced as having the magic

wand to advance international cooperation on its own. Here the neorealist averred that while states cooperate through institutions, they do it solely on the basis of their own decision and self-interest. The strong prevail in international relations. Institutions are no more than theater stages where the power play unfolds. However, the play has been written by the playwright: the states. Institutions are not important in their own right (Mearsheimer, 1995:340). The Bretton-wood institutions can be seen in this light, where the IFIs were established for the benefit of the US since 1945 and for the generality of the advanced West; also the recent World Trade Organization and series of other institutional initiatives representing the global interests of the dominant economic and political players. The WTO has on the face been mandated to promote free trade and intensify globalization for the benefit of all trading members which are states (Timamy, 2007). This observation is contrary to liberalist view on the erosion of the state; whereas the state is performing the underground job for their various countries and transnational groups, this is to assert that leads the path in any relations in the international system that involves both states and non-state actors.

### **Empirical evidences of states actions in a globalized world**

Against the backdrop of the pro-globalist assertion and liberal riposte on the erosion of the state in this era of complex interdependence; from all indications states with not only the economic and the political clout or power are still relevant, there by acceding to the view point of the realists on the inevitability of conflict in the international system which was equally accepted by the interdependence liberals (Keohane & Nye, 1977). In the light of challenges in the Middle East and the vulnerability of petroleum complexes and infrastructure to attack to attack by Islamist-based resistance movements, the *Caspian Sea and the Gulf of Guinea* emerged as central contenders in the calculus of global oil security by the major consumers of Europe and North America. However, the Caspian Sea faced formidable political and logistical problems, the “oil from the Gulf of Guinea was attractive for American consumers because it has a transport advantage to oil terminals on the East Coast of the US and low-sulphur lightweight content and fetches a premium for gasoline production.

According to Basse (2011), the Gulf of Guinea has been the subject of policy debate since early 1980s. This evolving geopolitical importance of the Gulf of Guinea assumed salient and critical dimensions as a consequence of the accelerating changes in relevant geopolitical parameters and the response of core powers to these new challenges to their vision of systemic security. The heightened prominence of discourse on the Gulf of Guinea is fallout from the accelerating political turmoil in the Middle-East, the rapidly growing global demand for oil, especially China and India as well as the United States and Europe. The question remains where are the individuals and the transnational groups in the contestations for oil among core states? Of course, it is glaring to all and sundry including the liberals; and other critical minds of the inevitability of the state actors wielding their power in this regard; since colonialization to the present international system. The pacesetting task is exclusively their preserve and not the other way round.

More revealing about the infallibility of the state and its power variable in the international system is the unilateral establishment of AFRICOM (The US African Command) without engaging the UN and the African Union about building multilateral peacekeeping capacity in the region (Volman, 2009). Studies indicate that there was no official consultation with any

state in Africa before it was announced in 2006, as point out by the late Nigerian President Musa Yar dua that he did not approve AFRICOM in Nigeria (<http://.independentngonline.com> December 16, 2007). Reasons for this US unilateral action cannot be far from the observation of Lawson (2007), that the US policy towards Africa in the medium term is largely defined by international terrorism, the increasing importance of African oil to American energy needs, and the dramatic expansion and improvement of some African relations since the turn of the century. Lawson's assertion resonates with Moeller (2008) summation at AFRICOM conference that protecting the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market was one of AFRICOM's guiding principles. He cited oil disruptions and the growing influence of China as major challenges to US interest in Africa. This submission by Moeller is in contradistinction with Whelan (2007) denial that AFRICOM was being established solely to fight terrorism or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. Reading through the lines there is a certainty that US established AFRICOM for their self-interest which informed the reason that even the receiving region was not carried along. The AFRICOM commander General Ward accentuated to the fact when he cited America's growing dependence on African oil as a priority issue for AFRICOM. Again, buttressing the point that state actors, are still relevant in global affairs.

### **Conclusion**

There is no point overstating the obvious that the state actors are actively and dominantly relevant in relations amongst state actors in the international system. Findings among theorists of the liberal persuasions stress the supplementary role individuals and groups play in the international system as such placing the transnational groups and individuals above the state is being polemical and obfuscating. Therefore, most arguments adduced by the liberals are merely academic exercise and as such the neo-realist arguments is superior to the former. The same pattern that was in practice during the scramble for overseas territorial space for Africa's raw materials by the West still persists to the present.

More importantly, the various global institutions of the world were the creations of state actors to advance their national interest in the international system that the struggle for power is the *ultima ratio*. For what explains the unilateral establishment of AFRICOM in Africa and others, if not the same old pattern of realist behaviour that characterized relations in an anarchical international system and afterwards the individuals and transnational groups begin to explore.

So loaded has been the rhetoric and so saturating has been the theoretical bombardment that the globe have been evangelized to view the individual and the transnational groups as the main actor in the international system in this era of globalization. To the gullible and the profoundly impressionistic, the non-state actors have assumed the Holy Writ, while the states are relegated to the background by the purveyors of the erosion of state power. This concluding remark remains cogent and potent "can a leopard change her spots?" if "yes" then the state ceases to be important in the international scene and if "no" then the state remains indispensable in global affairs. At least for the most part, there has been a symbiotic relationship between the state actors and non state actors over the years and that pattern persists to the present as such it would be puerile to equate the state actors with the non state actors.

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