A PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN ADVANCEMENT IN HISTORY AND PROGRESS IN MORALITY.

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Abstract:
It is common knowledge that we live in an era of “advanced civilization” with respect to scientific and technical progress, however, the phenomenon of barbaric violence and corruption that promote human misery makes one raise questions on the relationship between progress in history and morality. Experience shows that progress in history does not correspond to progress in morality. But what is the reason for the disparity and how can a harmony between the two be established? The paper sees in Kant’s theory of history and moral progress plausible answer to these questions, showing that advances in civilization do not coincide with progress in morality because history has only a moral aim but not a moral end. It is therefore by developing a civil society as the proper environment for the full development of man’s rational capacities that man’s natural world could be transformed into a moral world. Where, however, the establishment of a civil society is hindered, it is the courage to follow independent thought that is the last resort for the emancipation of the entire citizenry. The paper adopts descriptive and analytical methods and from its findings recommends some basic conditions that are to be fulfilled to ensure a balance between progress in history and morality.

Introduction
The growing domination of the political sphere by socio-economic or technical necessity has become a common feature of our world. The result is radical alteration in the articulation of the question of the nature of things and the good life. And as Walsh (1963:26) points out, the answer to the first necessarily carries with it an answer to the second. Hannah Arendt for one argues that it is creating pure politics that will help rehabilitate the specificity of the political sphere which has been invaded from all angles. Abou has remarked in Jean Halpérin and George Lévitte (1995:43-57) that in the face of the apparent failure of the nineteenth century positivists’ idea of progress and the German idealist philosophy of history, coupled with the worrisome ethical condition of our civilized society, the problem becomes more curious. Little wonder, the idea that progress was not limited to scientific and technological sphere, and the awareness that scientific and technical progress was not yielding corresponding progress in the other areas of human life, namely moral, became a turning point in the history of thought.

The concept of history as a progressive unfolding of human nature as manifest in reason and freedom, and of western civilization as a crowning of the process, exalting man as absolute master of nature and history had provided justification for all manner of adventure into domination and totalitarianism which plunged the world in two historic wars. But it did not take long before anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers began to kick against all forms of thought that pretend to universality and the absolute. Levi-Strauss considered philosophy of history as mere ideology, while political philosophers like Arendt and Léo Strauss held that history is devoid of finality, revealing no pretentions to human nature. In a situation as this, it is imperative to come to terms with our idea of history. A return to Kant in the direction of his third Critique read in could help to moderate our conception of philosophy. Dick Howard in an article in The Review of Metaphysics, Volume XXXIV, No 134 has described this kind of return as “a return of the historical as that problematic junction of freedom and necessity” (1980:348).

This paper, using descriptive and analytic method, exposes how Kant argues from the fact that all humans have common cognitive faculties and in principles are expected to respond to work of art in the same way by assuming aesthetic attitude by which the judgment of beauty is made to the claim that the judgment of beauty or taste falls within discussion of possibility of experience rather than that of science. His
assumption of two kinds of purposes in nature – formal and material – permits him to show how the reading of purpose into nature helps to clarify the link between what is and what ought to be. It is in this connection that Kant shows the link between nature and morality. For Kant, history as an element of culture is a part of nature since culture “involves the ways in which human beings make use of nature and natural objects”. It is history alone that can directly link nature as a whole with morality, thus endowing it with value. Kant’s analysis leads him to affirm two disparate finalities: one of history and another of moral. But he argues that nature reconciles this paradox by making man social and anti-social. It is by actualizing his disposition for rationality that man learns to put his anti-social instinct under control. This is what permits the establishment of a civil society.

This study goes ahead to show that in Kant’s view, once the sanctity of law is assured for all, a path opens up for the emergence of morality which entails attachment to “the concept of duty for its own sake and without regard for a hope of similar response from others”. Therefore, it is possible to reconcile progress in history with moral progress. After making some recommendations towards the end, this work concludes by remarking that although Kant’s idea of resolute use of reason to achieve emancipation may be inconsistent with his prohibition of revolution, it has its warrant in the sanctity of rights of the individual.

The Problem of Objectivity in Judgment of Taste
Barker, S in Monroe C. Beardsley (1983:70) tells us that Kant gives considerable attention to the problem of objectivity in a new light in his third Critique. Here the problem is presented in the form of the antinomy of taste. He underscores the apparent contradiction between two opposing views of ours with regard to the status of judgment of taste. Kant is shown to argue that the judgment of taste is not based upon concepts, in other words, judgment about beauty cannot state truth about matter of fact. The implication then is that claim to objective truth cannot be made with regard to the beautiful. The result is a clear affirmation of the saying that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. The assumption here is that there is no basis for claiming that the judgment of mister Q who asserts that a particular object is not beautiful is more correct or more mistaken than that of mister R who judges the same object as ugly. Granted this thesis, Kant goes on to make an opposing claim, an antithesis of the antinomy. The antithesis would then be a statement to show that the judgment of taste is based on concepts. His argument this time is that in all judgment about what is beautiful we do lay claim to objectivity, and we believe our claim to be legitimate. There is no time we make judgment about what is beautiful that we imagine that our claim is arbitrary or merely subjective. When we judge an object of beauty as beautiful, it is always our belief that anyone who judges to the contrary must be mistaken in his/her judgment. In Kant’s view therefore, it is important to find out the solution that does justice to the two sides—thesis and antithesis. In response to this difficulty, he affirms that judgments of taste are not based on any definite concepts, the way judgments on mathematics, natural science and ethics are. According to him the judgment of taste is based on an indefinite or indeterminate concept.

Commenting on Kant’s answer to the antinomy of taste, Barker in Beardsley (1983:71), remarks that two of our cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding, function in a special way. The judgments we make about beauty are possible because of this special kind of operations of our mind. Although one may not be able to prove it, one is entitled to assume that all human beings have the same kind of cognitive faculties. This means that one can legitimately claim that all humans must in principle be able to come to agreement in their judgment concerning beauty. It is however not intended that this agreement be attained through logical demonstrations that compel our assent as to what is beautiful and what is not. It is not possible to advance proofs here. The assumption is simply that agreement is possible on the basis of the claim that all humans have the same kind of cognitive faculties, and as such all of us should respond in the same way to any given work of art or natural phenomenon, so long as we allow our cognitive faculties to function in this special way without being constrained by other tendencies of the mind. Put simply, provided we attend to the object with a purely aesthetic attitude, it is disinterested attitude that is the requisite aesthetic attitude in the judgment of the beautiful.

Ordinarily, sensation has to do with response to stimulus rather than judgment. For instance, the sense of touch, when the subject “S” touches a cold object, “X” for block of ice, she feels cold. The feeling of touch is considered a subjective feeling in the sense that while “S” is touching “X” she is at the same time being touched by “X”. In other words, there is a high degree of immediacy in the relation of “S” to “X” that there
is little or no distance from one to other which would permit objectivity. But Kant introduces the notion of judgment in matter of taste. To speak of judgment is to speak of psychological state. The processes involved in the psychological state of judgment made possible through disinterested attitude with regard to what appears to be a matter of response to stimulus creates difficulty in understanding what Kant means by judgment of taste. However, with regard to the logical character of judgment, he distinguishes between what he calls in his earlier Critique determinate judgment and reflexive judgment. These elements are reintroduced in The Critique of Judgment (Bk 1, §22), making way for a connection with his view of history and progress.

Teleology and the Explanation of Nature

Kant identifies two-fold needs of reason, namely, the speculative and the practical. He gives priority to the practical needs. According to William James Booth (1986:34), it is the teaching of Kant that experience can be viewed in two ways:

- as a system according to transcendental laws, and as system according to empirical laws…
- The former system consists of those rules (categories) by which intuitions can be united in one consciousness: its rules are at the same moment the conditions of all possible experience. But experience must also be viewed as a system of potential empirical knowledge, as an object fit for scientific inquiry. The order of nature created by transcendental laws of experience makes our intuitions a possible object of coherent experience, of experience in the most rudimentary sense.

For scientific or systematic knowledge to be made possible there are of course, other elements acting in conjunction with rudimentary experiences. It is argued that since a distinction is made of two levels concerning the nature of experience, namely, “experience as a system according to transcendental laws” and experience “as something that can be worked up into scientific knowledge”, Kant’s intention in the Critique of Pure Reason was to demonstrate the possibility of simple experience rather than demonstration of the possibility of science (1986:35). What makes science possible is the classification of phenomena. It assumes the objects are knowable and can be connected to other like phenomena in a rule governed system. It is possible to have experience without having science, but the reverse is not possible. And nature is made in such a way that it conforms to man’s capacity for judging it. A certain systematic unity is needed in nature in order to study it. What we do is to call judgment of nature, the type of judgment that Kant refers to as reflexive judgment. In reflexive judgment there is no definite concept under which particular experience is subsumed. The employment of cognitive faculties is not allowed here, apart from principles. So, the reflexive judgment is thus a principle to itself in such situation. Given that the principle is not objective and cannot “introduce any basis of the cognition of the Object sufficient for the required purpose of subsumption”, Kant explains that “it must serve as a mere subjective principle for the employment of our cognitive faculties in a final manner, namely, for reflecting upon objects of a particular kind” (385:10-25).

Kant illustrates reflexive judgment with the process of thinking in the empirical part of the natural science. He argues that nature is purposeful; it is not arbitrary in its operations. It is in this sense that it satisfies the need of reason for systematic unity. The design which Kant discerns from nature is of two aspects: formal and material purposiveness. Material purposiveness is assumed to be present in nature as a whole even if it is not perceived. It is the assumption of the purpose in nature that makes inquiry into nature possible. John H. Zammito (1992:329) tells us that the order which is seen in nature occasions reflection about its ultimate purpose, and as such man’s intrinsic purpose. It is in this way that nature helps to “bring man to the crucial recognition of his freedom.” In the explanation of purpose in nature Kant introduced the idea of relative purposefulness. According to Zammito, relative purpose serves some other, active and hence ‘intrinsic’ purpose. Relative purpose is ‘external’; its purposiveness is not something inherent in its own essential principle, rather it only serves the intention of some other entity. Zamito uses example in nature to illustrate this point: “It is not the purpose of man to provide blood for mosquitos. But they use him anyway. Man is a relative purpose for them” (1992:327). William James Booth remarks that no explanation of phenomena is dependent on this kind of purposiveness; as a result Kant sees it as the weakest sense of purposiveness. Booth explains that
in order to claim validity for itself it must be able to determine some ultimate purpose of nature because without that ultimate purpose the whole range of subordinate utilities are denied their purposive status and revert once more to the level of contingent phenomena (1986:39).

According to Kant, we have the tendency to explain one phenomenon with another phenomenon. For instance, we say that nature knowing that those who live in desert will need the services of camels provided these men with them. But one wonders if the settlement of those men in a desert region was not itself contingent in the first place. If it is established that their settlement is part of nature’s design, then it could be concluded that the presence of camels find their purpose in their being settled there. Booth cautions that this type of “teleological judgment lacks the necessity that attaches to the idea of internal purposiveness” even though there may be evidence of purposiveness (1986:40). Since organisms are not to be explained mechanically, assuming purposiveness in them, explanation is offered in a way analogous to what obtains in conscious human activity. In other words, teleological concept is only read into them. The concept says something about human knowledge without really telling us something about nature itself. Fackenheim, E. L wonders how this explanation of biology helps us in understanding the link between what is with what ought to be which is the aim of Kant’s third Critique. The answer is that Kant wants to link the world of nature with that of morality. For Kant, nature as a whole must be seen to be purposive. Fackenheim in an article published in Kant-Studien, Band 48 Heft 3 explains that Kant’s argument is that nature must be shown to be a means to something which is an end in itself; and … [t]he only end-in-itself known to us is man as a moral, not as a natural being. And unless nature as a whole can be shown to be, directly or indirectly, a means to the realization of morality, it is a mere fact without value (1956/57:391)

Kant reasons that purposiveness could be assumed in some part of nature, and that is the sphere of history. As Fackenheim puts it, a teleological biology can encourage a teleological history. It is history that alone can directly link nature as a whole with morality, thus giving it value.

Kant’s Construction of History
Robert B. Louden (2000:140) locates one of Kant’s most important discussions of the philosophy of history in sections 83-84 of The Critique of Judgment. In the said Critique (379:25) Kant grounds his philosophy of history on the claim that in the study of nature we need to assume a concept of purpose. According to M. Budd, (July 2001:248), in a paper in The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 41, No. 3 the assumption of purpose as already indicated is simply a reflective judgment in that it makes possible something desirable concerning the power of judgment. It arouses a feeling of purposiveness already existing in the subject. The difficulty envisaged in the understanding of an organized system teleologically is the problem of infinite regress. To this end Kant postulates that there must be a final end of nature as a whole. As Louden, R. B explains, it is culture that qualifies for this end since it is part of human and in part nature, that is, it “involves the ways in which human beings make use of nature and natural objects” (2000:142). According to Louden, Kant uses culture here in a very broad sense. A teleological conception of history is thus the account of man’s cultural progress. Humanity progresses despite itself: the negative forces of rivalry, war, domination, injustice and human wickedness contribute in moving history further. The development of humanity’s full capacity is achieved only in society. In consequence, human beings are bound to enter civil society irrespective of whether it is a just or an unjust society. Kant in Perpetual Peace (1957:58) expresses the belief that the final aim of nature is “the establishment of universal and enduring peace” that will constitute the condition for the possibility of man’s realization of his full potentials.

A close look at Fackenheim’s clarification on Kant’s view of history will help us here. Kant is said to distinguish between the final end of nature and final end of the existence of a world, or of creation. With regard to the final end of nature he speaks of the development of human capacity in interaction with nature, whereas the final end of the world is located in human being as a moral being. Kant himself has this to say in this regard:

Only in man, and only in him as the individual being to whom the moral law applies, do we find unconditional legislation in respect of ends. This legislation, therefore, is what
alone qualifies him to be a final end to which entire nature is teleologically subordinated (435:30).

It is admitted that Kant’s distinction of ends portrays historical progress as distinct from moral progress. History is not a result of the free action of moral agents. Human beings are thus not the protagonists of human history. But this creates some problem. The distinction makes history mere facts without value. It is true that nature wants all her creatures to fulfill their destinies. But the case of man is unique since his destiny is the realization of reason and freedom. If man is not the author of his history then it will be difficult to see how he develops himself, that is, his reason and freedom. Should nature interfere with man’s history, it destroys his freedom and in consequence militates against the very realization of the man’s destiny that its nature desires. However, Kant tells us that nature reconciles this paradox by making man, at once, social and anti-social. Thus man’s instinct permits him to live neither with his fellows nor without them. In an attempt to escape this self-contradiction man has to make himself rational and free. He actualizes his disposition for rationality, and so progressively he learns to master his instinct through reason for should he use his reason as a mere means to the satisfaction of his contradictory instincts it will only help to increase human conflict.

If man is to live in community, Fackenheim, E. L. (1956/57:395), observes, he must restrain his desire, and at societal level, there is need for “an international order which restrains each nation to make all secure: an order which vouchsafes perpetual peace”. Man exercises freedom at two levels. First, at the cultural level man liberates his will from the tyranny of desire; it is the freedom to transform nature. As Fackenheim puts it,

History is a process which begins with cultural freedom and in the ideal future ends with the freedom of discipline. It begins with man’s partial transcendence and ends with his total transcendence of nature (1956/57:396).

The second level is the stage of freedom of discipline in which men master their desires for motives of enlightened self-interest. This is not yet a moral state. It is simply legal. It is concerned with man’s emancipation from nature. It is by internalizing a good constitution that a truly moral good person or community can emerge. It is nature that directs perpetual peace or what Kant calls “providence” which working in accordance with the law unknown to us directs its course to the objective final end of the human race (Kant, 1957:24). Fackenheim observes some difficulty here. If history is about carrying out of nature’s intentions, rather than the free actions of human individuals, then it will be hard to see how it leads to moral progress.

**History and Progress in Morality**

Kant’s philosophy of history is concerned with how external events and progress are achieved through political and legal means as nature compels history to its desired end. It is the dictates of the law of anti-social tendencies in us that we follow rather than our specific intentions as moral agents. However, it has been remarked that despite the focus of Kant’s philosophy of history on external events, there are indications that these are basically about moral progress. In his work, *Perpetual Peace*, one finds an interesting footnote (no.2) on the passage On the Opposition between Morality and Politics with Respect to Perpetual Peace. Here Kant tells us that it is the superior power of the state that puts individual’s inclination to violence under fetters. The situation creates a moral veneer to the whole and fosters the development of the requisite disposition for direct respect for the law. The assumption is that the sanctity of the law for each person is assured by state protection. In this way a great step is taken toward morality, “which is attachment to this concept of duty for its own sake and without regard to hope of a similar response from others” (1957:41). Once the mastery of instinct by reason is assured, the establishment of an ordered society and installation of correct habit of behavior engender real morality. Kant insists that besides the role of good constitution, education and religious institutions as part of the external structures help to prepare the way for morality. The liberation of the will of the individual from the despotism of desire is only a preparatory step. This detachment is required as predisposition for the individual to act according to reason. Morality like aesthetic experience requires a disinterested attitude. In a way it could be said that the internal changes that characterize moral progress are discernible from external signs or historical facts. In history’s match to progress, the phenomenon of war, the spirit of trade and international treaties among governments are all
means to the end-point of history, the perfection of the human species and the achievement of a “moral world”.

The condition of peace which follows the regulation of man’s interaction according to laws is what Kleingeld, P, in *History of Philosophy Quarterly, Volume 16, No.1* describes as “the condition under which the predispositions of humanity can be further developed, because peace provides a more hospitable environment for enlightenment and moral education than does war” (January 1999:61). Kant is said to envisage a republican constitution as providing the best form of government that makes for lasting peace. He proves this point in the following statement (1957:12):

This constitution is established, firstly, by principles of freedom of the members of a society (as men); secondly, by principles of dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and, thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens).

It is only with the empowering of the entire citizenry (Dupré, L, 1998:824) in which the rights of men are held to be sacred (Kant, 1957:46) that the attainment of lasting peace becomes possible. Thus the transformation of the crude moral disposition leads ultimately to the emergence of a moral world. In the ideal world everybody would obey the moral law from the motive of duty. But it is questioned whether Kant’s portrait of ideal moral exists objectively. It is affirmed that Kant certainly sees the ideal moral world as more of a regulative idea by which we are aided to transform the natural world into moral world. In the words of Anderson-Gold (March 1986:24) in a paper published in *International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume XXVI, No. 1 Issue 101*, “[t]he ethical commonwealth is the ideal which individuals must propose to one another as the means for overcoming the ethical state of nature”.

### Rational Development and the Quest for Emancipation

In his response to the question “What is Enlightenment?” Kant writes: “A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it, a lower degree of civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity”. Kant who had argued that the dignity of each person consists in his freedom to formulate objective maxims that are valid as laws for all men is here seen to place a wedge on human exercise of freedom. He had affirmed at the beginning of the document on Enlightenment that “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.” What is involved here is the lack of resolution and courage to use reason without direction from another.

John J. Ansbro explains Kant’s defense of the political freedom of every individual by remarking that it is grounded on the principles of freedom and equality. Freedom here refers to non-interference in the other’s proper domain that is the warrant for one’s entitlement to the pursuit of happiness. This is legally ensured in the separation of powers in the state. The second principle prescribes the equality of all members as subjects before the law. In the words of Ansbro, (Winter, 1973:90), in *The New Scholasticism, Volume XLVII, No. 1* “every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which he can earn through his talent, his industry, and his good fortune”. Ansbro notes that Kant’s introduction of a third element, namely, “the independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen” constitutes a source of conflict with his defense of the political freedom of the individual. Kant in the definition of citizenship had restricted it to adult males who are their own masters and have property to support themselves. On this point, Kant like his contemporaries showed the spirit of his time. This restriction of the political freedom of some people in the society appears to be balanced by Kant’s insistence on the absolute nature of the right of the individual with regard to the state when he states in *Perpetual Peace* that “all politics must bend its knee before the right”, and that “all rights of men must be held sacred, however much sacrifice it may cost the ruling power” (1957:46).

It appears that the sanctity of the right of the individual places some restraints on possible excesses on the part of the so-called active citizens. In other words, unjust laws can be resisted in defense of the rights of the individual. Of course, Kant could rightly be accused of compromising the principle of equality and freedom by his exaggerated attempt to secure a stable political order. As Ansbro puts it, Kant allows some members of his state the right to moral autonomy but not political autonomy. His denial of franchise to some people promotes paternalism contrary to his intention, and in consequence encouraging ignorance and error rather than promote Enlightenment. It is divorcing of morality from politics. It has also been pointed out
that his disenfranchisement of certain class of citizens contradicts the categorical imperative and treats some as means to an end. Expressing shock over the priority of rights given by Kant to the economically independent citizens, Joseph Gric (1996:454-455) writing in *Kant-Studien. Jahrgang, Heft* 4 states: But how does economic interest override the demands of duty and autonomy? An argument can be made to show, on the contrary, if economic dependence is an obstacle to full autonomy, Kant, on the basis of his ethics, should have argued that these dependent individuals are in fact being used as means to others’ gain and hence violate the categorical imperative. To safeguard autonomy, Kant should have argued that it is the duty of each state to ensure economic independence, and not compromise autonomy with economic circumstances.

Kant admits that although nature forces history to its moral end through a politics of self-interest, “true politics can never take a step without rendering homage to morality” (1957:46). However, the struggle to realize the moral ideal remains unpredictable; in other words, history is only an external process. As Louis Dupré puts it, history may contribute a lot to improve the conditions favourable to the development of man’s moral capabilities, but the actual realization of the moral development remains uncertain. This is because morals deal with the inner attitude that hardly becomes fully manifest, while history is concerned with public deeds and behavior.

**Progress in History and Morality**

Kant makes clear distinction between progress in history and in morality, but one may still want to know if it is still possible to speak of progress in morality. Dupré tells us that there is a link between history and morality; that even if the relationship is external in nature, it is nonetheless the other side of practical reason. In his own words, “The conditions favoring the practice of morality and freedom follow a progressive course, according to Kant, and do so necessarily” (June 1998:827-828). History, Kant affirms, is a learning process. The development of the rational capacities of man is transmitted not biologically, but through education mediated by cultural and social institutions. What explains the disparity of moral progress with progress in history is that in moral growth every individual begins the struggle to realize the moral ideal from the scratch, passing through the entire distance already covered by the preceding generations. In a word, while civilization advances from the already given, every individual makes a fresh and personal start in his moral advancement. Moral goodness is neither biologically transmissible nor culturally automatic.

Kant does claim that all humans at all time are endowed with the same rational predisposition. But Emil Fackenheim criticizes him on this point by saying that if humanity progresses in its development of freedom in the course of history, and that the insight on freedom gained by previous generation is transmitted to the succeeding one, then Kant is obliged to qualify freedom historically. This, Fackenheim argues, is inconsistent with Kant’s idea that every human agent is free without qualification. Moreover, since the preceding generation pass on their insight to the succeeding one without themselves being fully able to act morally, they are by this act reduced to mere means to progress from which succeeding generations profit. Kleingeld reformulates Fackenheim’s criticism by saying that since later generations have some educational advantage over the earlier one it means earlier generations will be blameworthy morally for some of their actions than later ones. The point Kleingeld makes in his reformulation of the objection against Kant is that it involves a moral evaluation rather than that of inconsistency. From Kantian framework, moral progress would naturally mean that previous generations were morally worse than later ones. But as free agents they bear full blame.

**Recommendations**

In the face of the reality of parallel and unequal development of civilization and morality in our time, Kant’s analysis of the relationship between history and morality has a lot to offer us. Having carefully exposed his understanding of the interplay of history and morality, underscoring the significant role which the civil society plays in this respect, this paper recommends that to ensure a balance between progress in history and morality the following points have to be taken serious by all human society that seeks proper emancipation of its citizen:

(a) There is the need to liberate the will of the individual from the despotism of desire.
(b) The civil society, a republican state requires a good constitution coupled with social institutions that through education can embolden its members to resolutely use their reason without direction from another.

(c) The sanctity of law which consists in equality of all members before the law has to be guaranteed.

Conclusion
From the foregoing exposition on Kant’s philosophy of history one notices that progress in history is determined by the vicissitudes of life. Nature drives history on inevitably with a view to improving the lots of mankind even without man’s co-operation, but this does not give the politician, for instance, the warrant to divorce morals from politics. The moral imperative stands despite the actual practice of politics as an act of the possible. This is why it is important to put in place a civil state that combining with other social and cultural institutions could create the enabling environment for moral progress and eventual emancipation of the citizens. Since an unjust state could control these institutions, it is the courage to follow independent thought that is the lee-way for the emancipation of the entire citizenry. This may be inconsistent with Kant’s prohibition of revolution, but it has its warrant in the sanctity of rights.

References